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At long last the Iraqi Parliament has been invited to convene by President Talabani today Sunday, March 12, and to elect its speaker and deputy speaker, if they can.
The AKP government of Tayyip Erdogan is trying to play a greater role in the Middle East, not only in the Palestine-Israel conflict but also in the chaotic situation in Iraq by adopting an equal distance policy towards all sides. But for how long will this policy be sustainable? Will there be an Islamist Iraq under the Shiites, which would be a threat to Turkey? Low intensity civil war has been an ongoing fact of life in Iraq, which has now the propensity to turn into a fully fledged civil war, basically between the Shiite majority and the Sunni minority, to affect the rest of the ethnic groups, the Kurds, the Turkmens, Assyrians, etc.
To help and assist, if possible, the ethnic groups at this critical stage is to the interest of all Iraqis as much as it is to the interest of Turkey. Any civil war in Iraq will be the proverbial house next door on fire with dire consequences for Turkey. Erdogan warned that "if this fire is not extinguished locally it will turn into a global fire." Acting Prime Minister of Iraq Ibrahim Jaafari wanted to come to Ankara and he was accordingly invited to pay a visit on Feb. 28 accompanied by a delegation including his deputy prime minister and the Minister of Communication Ahmet Chelebi, Minister of Electricity Muhsin Salash and some members of the Iraqi Parliament. The overdue debt of Iraq to the Turkish private sector, some $1.5 billion, flights to Baghdad by Turkish Airlines and Iraq importing more electricity from Turkey were also understood to have been discussed.
The formation of the Iraqi government, which has been delayed since the Oct. 15, 2005 elections, has now become a priority because sectarian clashes have cost hundreds of innocent lives, taking advantage of the fact that there is no government of consequence in Baghdad, no forceful authority to be imposed, and no force to be used against the insurgents as the police force is dispirited and of no consequence, every group having its own militia.
Therefore, the first item of priority in the Ankara discussions with Prime Minister Jaafari was most likely the urgent formation of the government. In that respect more understanding and tolerance towards the Sunni, Kurdish and Turkmen representations may have been urged for the formation of a broad-based government, rather than the winner-take-all mentality of the Shiite majority.
Prime Minister Jaafari, on the other hand, probably asked Prime Minister Erdogan for his mediation with the White House for a better understanding of the Shiites and not to be concerned about them as Iran's supposed long arm in Iraq.
Turkey has a large scale Sunni majority and a big Alawite minority close to Shiite Iraq, which puts Ankara in an ideal position to play a role of whatever importance or label at the right time for whatever can be done. Ambassador Oguz Çelikkol's recent Iraq visit, which made headlines after his return, was a useful attempt to make soundings on every front in the right direction as Turkey's special envoy for Iraq, giving messages about Turkey's willingness to recognize the Iraqi Kurds. The messages given to the Iraqis, including Prime Minister Jaafari in Ankara, were clear:
One, Iraq's territorial integrity must be preserved. This has been Turkey's position all along, as much as the U.S. position, and supported by all the Arab states in the region. Partition of Iraq on sectarian lines will be to the detriment of all, including the Iraqis.
Secondly, all the resources of Iraq, territorial and underground, must be common property and must belong to all Iraqis of whatever denomination or ethnic group. That is, oil and natural gas cannot be the monopoly of either the Shiites in the south or the Kurds in the north, disregarding the interest of the Sunnis in the middle where there is no oil.
Thirdly, there should be no ethnic superiority or inferiority among the ethnic groups. This means that the Shiite majority should not impose its will over the Sunni minority, or the Kurds against the Turkmens.
Four, there should be no claim of sovereignty among different sects. This may mean that no individual independence and sovereignty should be declared within the federal state structure. Kirkuk's status must be determined as a special status.
These points of principle are easier said than done. If all the interested parties were ready to agree within these guidelines the Iraq problem could be history tomorrow, but at this moment it looks like wishful thinking. Prime Minster Jaafari while in Ankara was reported to have said when asking for help: "The Americans could not do it. So the Turks must come to Iraq to stabilize the situation," that is, that Turkey should play the role of peacekeeper or peace-maker in Iraq, perhaps under the aegis of NATO or the UN.
Prime Minister Jaafari's visit was undermined by President Talabani, as he was curtly dismissive of Jaafari's right to do so as Jaafari does not represent Iraq," going so far as to say that "any agreement he makes or signs has no validity because I was not consulted as president about the visit, as I should have been." However, he did not forget to add that "the visit will not adversely affect Iraq's good relations with Turkey." This personal wrangle between Jaafari as the acting prime minister and President Talabani is enough to underline the domestic political infighting, not to say animosities. The present picture in Iraq's chaotic politics with all its personal jealousies is a microcosm of the communal and ethnic conflicts of interest.
This untimely visit, like the Hamas visit, may yet bring dividends, even if not overnight, for Turkey's importance in the region as recognized and perhaps supported by the Arab world, even against the diminished position of Jaafari. It is also rumored that this visit may be followed by that of another Shiite leader, Mukteda bin Sadr, to Ankara, in the same direction, but perhaps not to the liking of Washington. It was Bin Sadr who was pushing hard for Jaafari's prime ministership once again but his chances are now seen to have further diminished as he resisted Kurdish demands and did not deliver security and much needed public amenities. One Shi'ite leader after another visiting Ankara may be an indication of history in the making, which may denote the expectations of the Iraqi Shiites for Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gül to play a role in Iraq with the Sunnis, and even with the Kurds, as a voice of moderation and mediation.
For third parties as outsiders to meddle openly or clandestinely in Iraq's chaotic state bordering on civil war is nothing new. Iraqis themselves are fighting each other, Muslim Iraqi against Muslim brethren are savagely killing each other for strong sectarian reasons, and this has got to be stopped. The Turkish practice and example of religious and sectarian tolerance is needed in Iraq as a secular model to be emulated. In fact, during the Saddam regime there was a semblance of it with no record of sectarian clashes of any importance.
The U.S. ambassador to Iraq recently confessed that the U.S., by toppling Saddam, has opened a Pandora's Box. Nearly 60 percent of Americans now think, rightly, that the U.S. intervention in Iraq was a mistake and many Turks have thought so from the beginning, which is mistakenly interpreted as anti-Americanism.
It is true that Iraq has become the training ground of international terrorism supporting one side or the other. It is no secret that al-Qaeda elements are supporting the Sunni minority that have become pariahs to the present rulers of Iraq as a consequence of the downfall of Saddam. It is also visible that the fundamentalist hard line al-Qaeda elements do not even consider the Shiites as Muslims but as heretics.
It is also reported that al-Qaeda is gaining ground around the west of the capital Baghdad and seeking to establish themselves in the capital with increasing popular support as a strategic move against Shiite rule and supremacy and against the American occupation. The Sunni minority may be using al-Qaeda as their militia as a temporary means of self-defense against the Shiite majority, which currently has political control of Iraq, but what starts out as temporary may become a permanent fact of life to upset the balances in the long run against their own interests, that is, the Iraqi Sunnis may fall under fundamentalist control, which will alienate them from the rest of Iraq. The attack against the holy Shiite shrine, the Askeriye Mosque in Samarra, and the subsequent retaliatory attacks against dozens and dozens of Shiite mosques may be seen in this context.
Whether Turkey's greater role in the Middle East is a real possibility or a pipe dream, only time will tell.
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