Beirut -- Iranian threats to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in response to the continued international pressures on it, its declaration that it has moved to an advanced stage in enriching uranium, and the escalatory stances announced by Hezbollah Secretary General with respect to the Lebanese dialogue, the international tribunal, and the four arrested officers, are two sides of the same coin notwithstanding Hezbollah's denials that its stances were being shaped by potential regional developments.

The ongoing war of wills between Iran and the rest of the world are by all means affecting the threads tying together Tehran and its ally, Damascus, who are both fighting the 'same battle'.

The strongest proof of this was Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's declaration that a US war on Iran would mean 'another world, another nation, another set of balances, calculations and side-taking' in Lebanon.

If indeed the stances assumed by Tehran stand to make any sense to Iran and the policies laid down by its hard line leaderships ever since it was secretly planning to join the nuclear club, while it sought cover in Muhammad Khatami's moderate and open-to-dialogue character, then, what could explain the decision by its agent in Lebanon to embark on the sort of sharp escalation that revealed that Hezbollah no longer gives any weight to even the formalities it once resorted to in order to conceal its true convictions and be able to sell its demands?

The Riyadh Summit could be viewed as one more, and perhaps the last, test of the Syrian intentions, particularly in Lebanon. It is a test that is a part of a broader Arab assemblage, which opened a door for its return to the most rudimentary ideals of Arab solidarity.

Syria, however, chose to return to this solidarity only verbally, without providing any tangible proof to its acceptance of producing any shift in its policies starting, as a prerequisite, with Lebanon.

Damascus also failed to return to its old methods of exploiting regional and international inconsistencies to its advantage, and moving back and forth between the regional and international arenas whenever it felt the expediency, because the fundamental changes of policy demanded from it entails its acceptance of the international tribunal and dropping its opposition to it, whereas it views the same as a direct threat to its regime.

With the emergence of more voices in support of the eventuality of imposing this international legal body under the UN Security Council mechanism to circumvent the forcefully inactive Lebanese institutions; Damascus' only remaining option seems to lie in attempting to attack the very concept at the core of the international investigation in the assassination of Hariri, namely, by not recognizing even the preliminary results of this investigation.

This is perhaps what Nasrallah intended to say when he criticized the aim of the court as attempting to lay down the framework for pre-decided verdicts, and his demands for the release of the four officers under arrest.

A second source of concern for Damascus and Hezbollah lies in the progress being made in the Shebaa farms file and the possibility of a UN sanctioning of demands by the Fouad Siniora government to return these farms to Lebanon, following an Israeli withdrawal or its placement under an interim international mandate. This constitutes a source of embarrassment for Syria, which, to until this day, is refusing to recognize the Lebanese identity of these farms, and the demarcation of the borders with Lebanon in this particular area.

This was also the reason for Hassan Nasrallah's declaration that his Party's possession of arms is not subject to reclaiming the farms, nor to the issue of the prisoners, which is shrouded in silence, and is not likely to be revived by Israel in the foreseeable future.

This may have also been the reason for Nasrallah's threats to wage a 'long campaign' against 'those who are trying to transfer Lebanon completely to the US' side', which by extension means that the resistance's arms are aimed against the US, not just against Israel, and that the standoff will be tied to the US' standoff with Iran, which could drag on for decades.

Both Iran and Syria have come to realize that their wager on 'reaping the fruits' of the US predicament in Iraq was premature and unjustified, as international sanctions against Iran are being intensified are candidate for further intensification in the near future.

Both countries have also come to realize that the diplomatic visits to Damascus have not succeeded in easing neither in form, nor in content, the intensity of the international demands on Syria.

At the same time, the US and European declared policies with respect to the region's files are not expected to change in the foreseeable future, which was perhaps the reasons that led Syria and Iran to step up the tension in Lebanon; the main arena of the negotiations.

Picture: Hezbollah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah ( L ) , Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ( C) , Syrian president Bashar el Assad

By Hassan Haydar
Al-Hayat